Case Study: Somerset Levels Flooding — UK, Winter 2013–14

🌧️ Case Study: Somerset Levels Flooding — UK, Winter 2013–14

Background

The Somerset Levels is a low-lying coastal plain in south-west England — much of it at or below sea level — drained since medieval times by an intricate network of channels called rhynes. The name Somerset derives from 'Sumorsaete' (summer settlement) because the land was historically only reliably inhabitable in summer. About 160,000 hectares of farmland, several small towns, and dozens of villages occupy this landscape. It has flooded periodically throughout history. What happened in winter 2013–14 was not unusual in kind — but it was exceptional in scale and duration, and it exposed a long-running conflict over how the land should be managed.

The Event

Winter 2013–14 was the wettest winter in England and Wales for 250 years. A succession of deep Atlantic depressions tracked across the British Isles from December to February, each delivering heavy rainfall onto already saturated ground. By January 2014, the Rivers Tone and Parrett — the two main drainage rivers of the Somerset Levels — had overflowed, and the water had nowhere to go.

Statistic	Value
Duration of flooding (longest areas)	More than 6 weeks; some areas flooded from late December to March
Area flooded	17,000 acres (6,900 hectares) — largest area flooded in the UK since 1947
Homes flooded	600+ homes across the Levels
Agricultural losses	~£10 million — crops ruined, livestock stranded, land unusable into spring
January 2014 rainfall	200% of the monthly average on the Somerset Levels
Villages isolated	Several communities (including Muchelney and Thorney) accessible only by boat at peak flooding

Causes — Why Flooding Was So Severe (NOT just rainfall)

A common exam error is to state "Somerset flooded because it rained a lot." A Level 3 answer recognises that severity resulted from a combination of physical and human factors:

• Record precipitation: January 2014 delivered 200% of the average monthly rainfall. A succession of Atlantic depressions tracked over the British Isles from December 2013 to February 2014 — an unusual persistence driven by the jet stream holding in an unusually southerly position over weeks
• Saturated ground from autumn storms: Somerset's soils were already at or near field capacity from a wet autumn by December 2013. When January's rainfall arrived, there was virtually no infiltration capacity — almost all precipitation became surface runoff, immediately loading the drainage channels
• Rivers choked with sediment: The Rivers Tone and Parrett had not been dredged since the early 1990s, when the Environment Agency and Internal Drainage Boards reduced maintenance budgets. Decades of accumulated sediment had significantly reduced channel capacity — the rivers flooded at lower water levels than they were designed for
• Environment Agency 'managed retreat' policy: The agency had shifted from active river management toward allowing rivers to find natural courses — ecologically beneficial (wetland habitat creation) but conflicting with the agricultural drainage needs of the Levels. Local farmers argued this policy directly caused increased flooding severity
• Low-lying topography: The Somerset Levels sit at or near sea level, enclosed by the Mendip Hills, Quantock Hills, and Exmoor. Flood water had virtually nowhere to drain under gravity alone — the system required active pumping to remove water

Effects

• Village isolation: Muchelney, Thorney, and other communities were cut off by road for weeks — accessible only by boat or military amphibious vehicle. Army detachments delivered food and supplies
• Emotional and psychological toll: Residents described severe stress, sleeplessness, and depression. Some permanently relocated after the event rather than risk a repeat. The extended duration — weeks of uncertainty, not a single acute event — caused particular psychological damage
• Agricultural losses: £10 million in losses from damaged crops, stranded livestock, and flooded equipment. Some fields remained waterlogged into spring, preventing planting; others suffered structural damage to drainage infrastructure
• Road closure: The A361 (main road connecting Glastonbury to Bridgwater) flooded for several weeks, forcing diversions of up to 30 additional miles and severely disrupting local commerce and emergency access

Responses

• Short-term: Army deployed with high-volume portable pumps; amphibious vehicles delivered food to isolated villages; Environment Agency staff worked continuously at pumping stations; Secretary of State Owen Paterson visited and faced confrontational protests from local farmers
• Political controversy: "Why has the river not been dredged?" became the political flashpoint. Local communities and farmers were furious at the Environment Agency's managed retreat policy; the national media amplified the conflict
• Somerset Flood Action Plan (£100 million): Announced in spring 2014; included emergency dredging of 8 km of the Rivers Tone and Parrett (completed 2014–15 — the first dredging since the early 1990s), upgrading pumping stations, pre-positioning portable flood barriers for rapid deployment in future events, and establishing a real-time river monitoring network
• Contrast with LIC responses: Somerset received no international aid — the UK government funded the entire response. This illustrates the key difference in self-sufficiency between HICs and LICs facing weather hazards. The £100 million plan was funded from national government budgets without external assistance; for comparison, the Philippines required over $1.5 billion in international aid to respond to Haiyan