Appeasement in Action: Three Escalations

Escalation 1: Rhineland (7 March 1936) — "Germany walking into its own backyard"
Hitler sent just 22,000 troops — with orders to retreat if France resisted — against a French army of approximately 250,000. France would not act without a British guarantee; Britain dismissed it as Germany entering its own territory. The argument for inaction seemed reasonable in the moment. But the consequence was fatal: Hitler concluded the democracies would never use force. He later acknowledged (in Albert Speer's account) that a French counter-move would have forced a humiliating retreat. Because it did not come, every later escalation was possible.

Escalation 2: Anschluss (12 March 1938) — "Self-determination in action"
After forcing Schuschnigg to resign at Berchtesgaden in February 1938, Hitler marched troops into Austria when Schuschnigg announced a plebiscite. Britain and France accepted the Anschluss: Austria was German-speaking, and Wilson's own principle of self-determination seemed to justify unification. A rigged plebiscite reported 99.7% support. But Hitler had now absorbed a sovereign nation of 7 million people — with Austrian gold reserves, manpower, and a border position threatening Czechoslovakia on three sides — without facing any consequence. If Austria could be absorbed without resistance, why would Czechoslovakia be different?

Escalation 3: Sudetenland (September 1938) — "The last territorial demand"
Hitler demanded the Sudetenland — the western rim of Czechoslovakia where 3 million ethnic Germans lived and where all of Czechoslovakia's mountain fortifications were located. Chamberlain flew to Germany three times. At Munich (29 September 1938), Britain and France handed over the Sudetenland without consulting Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain returned declaring "peace for our time." The RAF had fewer than 1,500 aircraft; his military advisers said Britain could not win a war in 1938. The case for appeasement again seemed defensible — self-determination, military unpreparedness, public anti-war opinion. Six months later, Hitler seized the rest of Czechoslovakia. This proved the fundamental problem: because Hitler's true aim was Lebensraum, his demands could never stop at a negotiated line.

= The fatal flaw of appeasement: Lebensraum
The chain is what Grade 9 answers must show: Rhineland (1936) proved the Allies would not fight → Anschluss (1938) proved an entire sovereign nation could be absorbed without consequence → Sudetenland (1938) pushed further still, handing over Czechoslovakia's mountain defences → Prague (March 1939) seized the rest, revealing that Hitler's aims went far beyond Versailles grievances → Poland triggered the war. At each stage, appeasement did not satisfy Hitler's demands; it confirmed that larger demands would also go unchallenged. Mein Kampf (1925) had explicitly stated Lebensraum — the racial conquest of eastern Europe — as Hitler's ultimate goal. Lebensraum cannot be satisfied by concession because it requires the permanent subjugation of other peoples, not the correction of treaty boundaries. Chamberlain was not foolish — but he was negotiating with a man whose final goal was war, not peace.